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SYMPOSIUM ARTICLE: HOW YOUNG AMERICAN
ATHLETES CAN BEST CHALLENGE A
BUREAUCRACY THAT PREVENTS THEM
FROM EARNING A LIVING
Marc Edelman*
INTRODUCTION
Young American football and basketball players are the victims of a
complex bureaucracy that prevents them from earning a living based
on their athletic prowess. In the first instance, these athletes are de-
nied the opportunity to earn money while attending college based on
the NCAA Principle of Amateurism - a principle that maintains the
wealth of college sports "in the hands of a select few administrators,
athletic directors, and coaches."' In the second instance, these same
athletes are also denied the opportunity to compete in high-profile
professional sports leagues such as the NFL and NBA based on collec-
tively bargained age and education requirements that are adopted by
sports leagues and their players' unions.2
For generations, American society simply ignored the harms caused
by concerted efforts to deprive young athletes of their free market
opportunities. However, in recent years there has been an increased
understanding that America's treatment of its young athletes is troub-
lesome because it deprives them of financial opportunities that only
* Professor Marc Edelman (Marc@MarcEdelman.com) is an Associate Professor of Law at
the Zicklin School of Business, Baruch College, City University of New York. He is also a
summer adjunct professor at Fordham University School of Law and a columnist for Forbes
SportsMoney. Professor Edelman earned his B.S. in economics from the Wharton School (Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania) and both his J.D. and M.A. from the University of Michigan. Professor
Edelman has published more than twenty law review articles on the intersection of sports and
the law, and he has lectured nationally on sports law topics. He thanks his wife, Rachel Leeds
Edelman, for reviewing an earlier draft of this article.
1. Marc Edelman, note, Reevaluating Amateurism Standards in Men's College Basketball, 35
U. Micii. J. L. RuIORM 861, 864 (2002).
2. See, e.g., NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement, Art. 6, Sec. 2(b), at 17, available at http://
nfllabor.files.wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-bargaining-agreement-2011-2020.pdf (stating that
"[nlo player shall be permitted to apply for special eligibility for selection in the Draft, or other-
wise be eligible for the Draft, until three NFL regular seasons have begun and ended following
either his graduation from high school or graduation of the class with which he entered high
school, whichever is earlier").
135
136 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. [Vol. 9:135
exist for an ephemeral period of time.3 Moreover, for those young
athletes that suffer an injury while playing college sports, the Ameri-
can sports bureaucracy may forever prevent them from realizing the
fruits of their labor.4
In light of the foregoing, this symposium article discusses how
young American athletes could best challenge the bureaucracy that
delays their ability to earn a livelihood. Part I of this symposium arti-
cle discusses how young American athletes could effectively challenge
the NCAA 'no pay' rules under federal antitrust law as an illegal re-
straint of trade. Part II then addresses the possibility of these same
athletes challenging professional sports leagues' age requirements
under both antitrust law and labor law.
I. CHALLENGING THE NCAA 'No PAY' RULES UNDER SECTION
ONE OF THE SHERMAN ACT
Antitrust Overview
For a young American athlete that seeks to profit from playing his
sport, the starting point for challenging the bureaucracy that prevents
him from doing so involves bringing a lawsuit against the NCAA.
Even though the NCAA Principle of Amateurism is long entrenched
in college athletics, its longevity, of course, does not necessarily signal
its legality.
Section One of the Sherman Act, in pertinent part, states that
"[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy in the restraint of
trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal."5 When applying this
section of antitrust law, a court must decide whether a particular re-
straint is illegal by applying a well-established process. An antitrust
plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the restraint involves
"concerted action between two legally distinct economic entities," and
that the restraint unduly suppresses competition within some relevant
3. See, e.g., Warren Zola, Transitioning to the NBA: Advocating on Behalf of Student-Athletes
for NBA & NCAA Rule Changes, 3 HARVARD J. OF SPORTS & ENT. L. 159 (2012) (discussing
how the current NBA and NCAA rules work to the detriment of student-athletes who want to
earn a livelihood); Darren Heitner, Money and Sports, Economic Realities of Being an Athlete, 8
DEPAUL J. OF SPORTS L. & CONTEMPORARY PROBEiIMs 161, 161 (2012) (explaining that college
athletics is a "billion-dollar business" that is "built on the backs of amateur athletes").
4. See generally Kristen Chiger, Calling Personal Foul on a Workers' Compensation System,
NCAA Student Athletes are Being Denied the Protection They Deserve, U. OF DENV. SPORTS &
ENT. L. J. (2013) (publication forthcoming), draft available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract id=2257274 (explaining how the young athletes injured while performing in college
sports have sometimes been denied workers' compensation).
5. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000).
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market.6 Then, if the plaintiff is able to meet this burden, the defend-
ants may raise affirmative defenses to attempt to negate the finding of
an antitrust violation. Examples of potential affirmative defenses may
include that the restraint is procompetitive on its economic merits or
that the restraint falls within an antitrust law exemption such as the
non-statutory labor exemption.7
When applying Section One of the Sherman Act to the NCAA
Principle of Amateurism, a court might find the principle to be illegal
- not only because it involves more than 1200 separate colleges fixing
the pay of student-athlete labor at a predetermined amount, but also
because it serves as a form of group boycott against any college that
refuses to abide by this wage restraint.8
Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma v. NCAA
The most well-known court decision to support a finding that the
NCAA 'no pay' rules violate Section One of the Sherman Act is a
Supreme Court case from nearly thirty years ago - Board of Regents
of the University of Oklahoma v. NCAA. 9 There, the Supreme Court
held that the NCAA's attempt to limit the number of games that any
NCAA member may broadcast on television violated Section One of
the Sherman Act. That case, originally filed in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Oklahoma, lays an important framework for under-
standing the NCAA for what it truly is - a monopolistic trade associa-
tion that is fully subject to, and sometimes in violation of, antitrust
law.
Many subsequent court decisions have attempted to limit the Board
of Regents holding to simply prohibiting broadcast restraints; how-
ever, a close reading of Board of Regents reveals that it truly stands
for a far broader proposition - that any commercial agreement im-
posed by NCAA members that results in the expulsion of a non-com-
6. Prime 24 Joint Venture v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 219 F.3d 92, 103 (2d. Cir. 2000); see also Marc
Edelman, A Short Treatise on Amateurism and Antitrust Law: Why the NCAA's 'No Pay' Rules
Violate Section One of the Sherman Act, 64 CASE W. Ris. L. REV. (2013) (publication forthcom-
ing), draft available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2226541, at *11.
7. For a discussion of the various affirmative defenses cited frequently in sports antitrust
cases, see Marc Edelman, Does the NBA Still Have Market Power: Exploring the Antitrust Impli-
cations of an Increasingly Global Market for Men's Basketball Labor, 41 RUTGERS L. J. 549, 554-
60 (2010).
8. See Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Amateurism and Antitrust Law: Why the NCAA's
'No Pay' Rules Violate Section One of the Sherman Act, 64 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW RE-
VIEW _ (2013) (publication forthcoming), draft available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract id=2226541, at *15-24.
9. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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plying member is subject to Rule of Reason inquiry.10 Indeed, the
district court opinion in Board of Regents held, among other things,
that the NCAA's television arrangement was illegal because it in-
cluded "mechanisms for punishing cartel members" that fail to comply
with the restraint." The opinion also stated that "[a]s a practical mat-
ter, membership in the NCAA is a prerequisite for an institution wish-
ing to sponsor a major, well-rounded athletic program," and thus any
attempt to ban a program from the NCAA presents substantial anti-
trust risk.12
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit thereafter affirmed
the district court's conclusions in Board of Regents - explaining that
the NCAA's restriction on the number of games that a member could
play on television was indeed illegal, and that the threat of expelling
members that refused to go along with the plan "clearly ha[s] anticom-
petitive potential."13 This latter conclusion is critical to overturning
the NCAA 'no pay' rules because, much like the NCAA broadcast
restraints, the NCAA 'no pay' rules are enforced by the threat of
member expulsion.
The Supreme Court thereafter again affirmed Board of Regents, al-
though it never directly addressed the antitrust argument against
threatening to expel members. The Supreme Court, of course, did not
have to address that argument because it separately found the NCAA
restraints on television broadcasts to be sufficient grounds for af-
firming an antitrust violation.14 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court also
did nothing to imply that the NCAA's threat of expelling a member
for non-compliance would survive under antitrust scrutiny - meaning
10. C.f National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 99 (1984) (ex-
plaining that "by participating in an association which prevents member institutions from com-
peting against each other on the basis of price or kind of television rights that can be offered to
broadcasters, the NCAA member institutions have created a horizontal restraint-an agreement
among competitors on the way in which they will compete with one another").
11. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 546 F. Supp.
1276, 1301 (D.C. Oki. 1982).
12. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 546 F. Supp.
1276, 1288 (D.C. Oki. 1982).
13. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 707 F.2d 1147,
1161 (10th Cir. 1983).
14. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 108-109 (1984) (finding
the NCAA's television plan illegal because it "eliminates competitors from the market, since
only those broadcasters able to bid on television rights covering the entire NCAA can compete,"
and further explaining that "when there is an agreement in terms of price or output, no elaborate
industry analysis is needed to demonstrate the anticompetitive characteristics of such
agreement").
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that, to this day, the presumptions made by the Tenth Circuit in Board
of Regents still remain in place, at least within the Tenth Circuit.' 5
Law v. NCAA
Since the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Board of Regents, sev-
eral subsequent decisions have applied language from that case to find
other types of NCAA conduct to similarly violate Section One of the
Sherman Act. Most importantly in the context of labor markets, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held in Law v. NCAA
that it was illegal for NCAA members to the fix salaries of relatively
junior assistant coaches. 16 In addition, the court in Law rejected nu-
merous affirmative defenses raised by the NCAA with respect to pur-
ported procompetitive benefits of the restraint. For example, the
court in Law found that the NCAA could not defend a coaching sal-
ary cap as a cost cutting mechanism because "cost-cutting by itself is
[never] a valid procompetitive justification."1 7 In addition, the court
found that the NCAA could not cap assistant coach's salaries on social
policy grounds because if social policy was deemed to be an affirma-
tive defense, it would emasculate the entire doctrine of antitrust law.1 8
15. For purposes of full disclosure, it is important to point out that there is dictum in the
Supreme Court's Board of Regents opinion noting that the NCAA's non-payment of its student-
athletes "can be viewed as procompetitive." Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Re-
gents, 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984). However, based on the context, it seems clear that the Court is
merely stating that the NCAA 'no pay' rules are subject to Rule of Reason review and are not
per se illegal. See id. Thus, the Court is unlikely making any judgment on the merits about the
NCAA's 'no pay' rules. See id. Moreover, the Supreme Court further notes that "the student-
athlete in higher education adds richness and diversity to intercollegiate athletics and is entirely
consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act." Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Re-
gents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984). However, this language, once again, is completely irrelevant to
assessing the ultimate legality of the NCAA's *no pay' rules, as it simply is a statement with
regard to public policy, and not economics with respect to any particular issue. See id.; see also
Nat'l Society of Prof'l Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (explaining that a
proper antitrust analysis is based exclusively on economic effects and not on public policy).
16. Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998).
17. Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n. 134 F.3d 1010, 1022 (10th Cir. 1998).
18. Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n. 134 F.3d 1010, 1021-22 (10th Cir. 1998) (explaining
that "[w]hile opening up coaching positions for younger people may have social value apart from
its affect (sic) on competition, we may not consider such values unless they impact upon compe-
tition"). For further discussion of why modern courts will not allow social policy justifications to
save otherwise anticompetitive conduct, see National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (explaining that "[t]he assumption that competition is the best
method of allocating resources in a free market recognizes that all elements of a bargain-quality,
service, safety, and durability-and not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free
opportunity to select among alternative offers," and that "[e]ven assuming occasional exceptions
to the presumed consequences of competition, the statutory policy precludes inquiry into the
question whether competition is good or bad").
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Prospective Legal Challenge to NCAA 'No Pay' Rules
Based on the holdings of Board of Regents and Law, Tenth Circuit
courts may provide the best forum to challenge the NCAA 'no pay'
rules. Playing off the favorable language from the lower court opin-
ions in Board of Regents and Law, a prospective plaintiff's complaint
against the NCAA should allege that the NCAA has market power
over college basketball labor markets and that the NCAA members
have restrained trade in those markets by fixing college athlete sala-
ries below the free-market rate and using the threat of expelling mem-
bers to ensure the restraint's enforcement.
It is critical to note, however, that any prospective plaintiff seeking
to bring an antitrust suit against the NCAA should absolutely file in
the Tenth Circuit because many courts outside of the Tenth Circuit
have taken a more deferential view toward the NCAA Principle of
Amateurism.19 A few courts, such as those based in the First, Third,
and Sixth Circuits, have even gone as far as to dismiss antitrust chal-
lenges against the NCAA as early as the motion to dismiss stage -
foreclosing plaintiffs' antitrust claims before even getting to the ful
merits.20
For those interested in a far more detailed discussion about each of
the above points - including a thorough discussion of why the Su-
preme Court's holding in Board of Regents is truly favorable to a
plaintiff seeking to challenge the NCAA Principle of Amateurism - I
encourage you to read my upcoming law review article, A Short Trea-
19. See, e.g., Smith v. Nat'1 Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 139 F.3d 180 (3d. Cir. 1998) (upholding
NCAA bylaws related to academic eligibility for athletes that wish to play a sport while attend-
ing graduate school); McCormack v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir.
1988) (rejecting an antitrust challenge to the NCAA's death penalty sanction that was filed by an
alumnus, college football players, and cheerleaders at Southern Methodist University); Hennes-
sey v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding that an NCAA limit
on the number of college coaches per team fails under the Rule of Reason); Bassett v. Nat'l
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2008) (upholding a rule that required colleges to
consult with the NCAA before hiring coaches with previous rules infractions); Justice v. Nat'l
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 577 F.Supp. 356, 382, n. 17 (D. Ariz. 1983) (upholding an NCAA
bylaw that disqualified the University of Arizona football team from post-season play because
football players had accepted benefits such as free transportation and lodging).
20. See, e.g., Smith v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 139 F.3d 180, 185, (3d. Cir. 1998) (hold-
ing that "the Sherman Act does not apply to the NCAA's promulgation and enforcement of
eligibility requirements"); Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2008)
(describing an NCAA restraint on hiring previously sanction coaches as "anti-commercial");
Gaines v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 746 F. Supp. 740 (M.D. Tenn. 1990) ) (holding that a
plaintiff wishing to return to college football after entering the NFL draft could not bring an
antitrust challenge); Jones v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 392 F.Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975)
(holding that NCAA eligibility guidelines are "non-commercial" and thus exempt from antitrust
challenge).
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tise on Amateurism and Antitrust Law, which will be published this fall
in the Case Western Reserve Law Review. 21
II. CHALLENGING PRO SPORTS LEAGUES' AGE REQUIREMENTS
UNDER ANTITRUST AND LABOR LAW
In addition to filing an antitrust challenge against the NCAA 'no
pay' rules, young athletes may also attempt to free themselves from
the American sports bureaucracy by challenging professional sports
leagues' age requirements under either antitrust or labor law.
Antitrust Challenge to Sports Leagues' Age Requirements
The likelihood of successfully using antitrust law to overturn sports
leagues' age requirements depends on how broadly the reviewing
court interprets the non-statutory labor exemption to antitrust law.
This is an issue that has been the source of many law review articles,
but few judicial opinions.22
The only sports case to directly explore the application of the non-
statutory labor exemption to a collectively bargained age requirement
was Clarett v. National Football League - a Second Circuit decision
that held the NFL age requirement was entirely exempt from antitrust
scrutiny because it was a product of the collective bargaining pro-
cess.23 Nonetheless, Clarett was decided by a circuit that has tradition-
ally applied the non-statutory labor exemption more broadly than
most others.24 Thus, at least some circuits may disagree with that
case's holding.
Of particular note, the Third, Sixth, Eighth and D.C. Circuits have
each adopted a far more rigid test for the non-statutory labor exemp-
21. See Marc Edelman, A Short Treatise on Amateurism and Antitrust Law: Why the NCAA's
'No Pay' Rules Violate Section One of the Sherman Act, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REv. (2013) (publi-
cation forthcoming), draft available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=
2226541.
22. See, e.g., Marc Edelman & Joseph A. Wacker, Collectively Bargained Age/Education Re-
quirements: A Source of Antitrust Risk for Sports Club-Owners or Labor Risk for Players Un-
ions? 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 341 (2010); Marc Edelman & Brian Doyle, Antitrust and "Free
Movement" Risks of Expanding U.S. Professional Sports Leagues into Europe, 29 Nw. J. Ir'L L.
& Bus. 403 (2009); Ryan Rodenberg, The NBA's Latest Three Point Play: Age Eligibility Rules,
Antitrust, and Labor Law, 25 ENr. AND SPORTS LAWYER 14 (2008); Michael McCann, Illegal
Defense: The Irrational Economics of Banning High School Players from the NBA Draft, 3 VA.
SPORTs & Er. L. J. 113 (2004); Michael McCann, Illegal Defense: The Law and Economics of
Banning High School Players from the NBA Draft, 1 VA. SPORTS & Ewr. L. J. 295 (2002).
23. See Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 125 (2d. Cir. 2004).
24. See Marc Edelman & Brian Doyle, Antitrust and "Free Movement" Risks of Expanding
U.S. Professional Sports Leagues into Europe, 29 Nw. J. ITwr'L L. & Bus. 403, 427 (2009) (ex-
plaining that as compared to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,"[m]ost other
U.S. courts have taken a far more narrow view of the non-statutory labor exemption").
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tion, which makes the challenge of a sports league's age requirement
perhaps more feasible. In each of these four circuits, courts will only
apply the non-statutory labor exemption where three separate condi-
tions apply: (1) the restraint involves a mandatory subject of bargain-
ing; (2) the restraint primarily affects the parties involved in the
collective bargaining relationship; and (3) the restraint is reached
through bona-fide arms' length bargaining.25 Applying this more ex-
acting test for the non-statutory labor exemption, one could reasona-
bly conclude that collectively bargained age requirements lie outside
of the exemption because they fail under the second prong of the rele-
vant test - they do not primarily affect only the parties to the collec-
tive bargaining process. 26
Presuming that a plaintiff is able to navigate his way around these
murky waters, the rest of the legal argument becomes far more tena-
ble.2 7 Indeed, outside the context of the non-statutory labor exemp-
tion, just about every court to review a sports league's age
requirement has found the requirement to violate antitrust law.2 8 For
example, in Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California held that the NBA's old
age requirement that kept players out the league for four years after
graduating from high school was illegal because "by pooling their eco-
nomic power, the individual members of the NBA have [illegally] es-
tablished their own private government." 29 Similarly, in Linseman v.
World Hockey Association, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Connecticut overturned the defunct World Hockey Association's age
requirement, explaining that the "[e]xclusion of traders from the mar-
25. See Marc Edelman & Joseph A. Wacker, Collectively Bargained Age/Education Require-
ments: A Source of Antitrust Risk for Sports Club-Owners or Labor Risk for Players Unions? 115
PENN Si. L. REV. 341, 366 (2010) (discussing this more narrow view of the non-statutory labor
exemption, adopted by the Third, Sixth, Eighth and D.C. Circuits).
26. See generally Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers of America v. Local Union No. 1, 404, U.S.
157, 172-73 (determining that retired employees are not part of the collective bargaining rela-
tionship because they did not have a vote in choosing either side's representatives).
27. One remaining antitrust hurdle involves proving that the sports league exercises power
over the relevant labor market - an argument that is perhaps more difficult to make against the
NBA than against the NFL, given the increasing number of overseas employers of premier pro-
fessional basketball labor. See Marc Edelman, Does the NBA Still Have Market Power: Explor-
ing the Antitrust Implications of an Increasingly Global Market for Men's Basketball Labor, 41
RUTGERS L. J. 549 (2010).
28. See, e.g., Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, 325 F. Supp.1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971);
Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1322 (D. Conn. 1977); Boris v. United
States, Cv. 83-4980 LEW, 1984 WL 894 (C.D. Cal., Feb. 28, 1984) (each finding a sports league's
age requirement that was implemented outside the scope of collective bargaining to violate Sec-
tion One of the Sherman Act).
29. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, 325 F. Supp.1049, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
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ket by means of combination or conspiracy is so inconsistent with the
free-market principles embodied in the Sherman Act that it is not to
be saved by reference to the need for preserving the collaborators'
profit margins."30
Labor Law Challenge to Sports Leagues' Age Requirements
Finally, a labor law challenge to a sports league's age requirement
would turn on whether a court were to find that a players union
breached its duty to provide fair representation by agreeing to an age
requirement. Although no young professional athlete has ever at-
tempted to challenge a collectively bargained age requirement under
labor law, the idea of such a challenge was briefly broached in dicta of
Judge Sotomayor's Second Circuit Court of Appeals opinion, Clarett
v. NFL, which noted that the union's right to treat certain categories
of players superiorly to others is "subject of course to the representa-
tive's duty of fair representation." 31
Nevertheless, even a labor law claim is not without its own set of
legal challenges. As discussed above, it is not entirely settled whether
a court would find a players union to legally represent prospective
league entrants that are deemed too young to enter the league draft.32
In addition, even if a union is deemed to adequately represent all
those that seek to enter the league, it is not entirely settled whether a
sports union's decision to impose an age requirement would be
deemed impermissible.
Various Supreme Court decisions have explained that a union only
breaches its duty of fair representation if the union acts arbitrarily,
discriminatorily, or in bad faith.33 However, few courts have put forth
a clear definition, in this context, of the term "discriminatorily." 3 4
Some courts imply that union conduct is only discriminatory if it
harms a statutorily protected class such as one based on race or gen-
der - a view that forecloses any labor law challenge to sports leagues'
30. Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1322 (D. Conn. 1977) (internal cita-
tions and quotations omitted).
31. Clarett v. Nat'l Football League, 369 F.3d 124, 139 (2d. Cir. 2004).
32. See Marc Edelman & Joseph A. Wacker, Collectively Bargained Age/Education Require-
ments: A Source of Antitrust Risk for Sports Club-Owners or Labor Risk for Players Unions? 115
Pi NN ST. L. REV. 341, 365-67, 369 (2010) (explaining how case law seems to be split on whether
a union may represent non-employees).
33. See, e.g., Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild 525 U.S. 33 (1998); Vaca v. Snipes, 386 U.S. 171,
177 (1967).
34. See Marc Edelman & Joseph A. Wacker, Collectively Bargained Age/Education Require-
ments: A Source of Antitrust Risk for Sports Club-Owners or Labor Risk for Players Unions? 115
PENN ST. L. REV. 341, 371-73 (2010) (discussing the various meanings courts have adopted for
the term "discriminatory").
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age requirements. Meanwhile, other courts, including those based in
the Second and Tenth Circuits, have implied that any union decision
that harms a group with minority voting interest, or no voting interest,
would be deemed as discriminatory.35 Applying this far broader test
for whether union conduct is discriminatory, it would seem illegal for
a union to determine worker preferences based on any classification
that is irrelevant to job performance. Thus, one could surmise that
age requirements in professional sports leagues are illegal so long as
there is no evidence to show a meaningful link between one's age and
his job performance as a professional athlete.36
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, young American football and basketball
players have various legal alternatives to challenge the bureaucracy
that delays their ability to earn an income as athletes. One alternative
would be to file an antitrust lawsuit against the NCAA under Section
One of the Sherman Act, alleging that the NCAA Principle of Ama-
teurism serves as an illegal restraint of trade that fixes student-athlete
pay at a predetermined amount. This first type of legal claim is
strongest if filed in a federal district court based in the Tenth Circuit
because of the favorable antitrust precedent set by the Law and Board
of Regents decisions.
A second alternative would be for a prospective plaintiff to bring an
antitrust challenge against a sports league's age requirement, contend-
ing that the age requirement serves as a form of illegal group boycott.
This second type of antitrust challenge is strongest if filed in either the
Third, Sixth, Eighth or D.C. circuits based on these circuits' seemingly
more narrow application of the non-statutory labor exemption.
Meanwhile, an antitrust challenge to a sports league's age require-
ment would almost certainly fail if brought in the Second Circuit
35. See, e.g., Jones v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 495 F.2d 790, 798 (2d. Cir. 1974) (noting that
for a union to avoid a lawsuit under the duty of fair representation, the union must "provide
procedural safeguards for minority members in the collective bargaining unit" - defining the
term "minority" in a manner far broader than merely a statutorily protected class); Aguinaga v.
United Food & Commercial Workers, 993 F.2d 1463, 1470 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that it is a
violation of the duty of fair representation for a union to determine worker preferences based on
any classification that is not directly relevant to job performance).
36. For an example of one study that seems to discount the argument that student-athletes
benefit from the college experience, see, e.g., Michael McCann, Illegal Defense: The Irrational
Economics of Banning High School Players from the NBA Draft, 3 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 113
(2004) (concluding that on average, over the duration of their careers, the NBA players who are
drafted directly from high school outperform those who enter the league after completing at
least some college).
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based on the unfavorable precedent set by that circuit in Clarett v.
Nat'l Football League.
Finally, a third legal alternative for a young athlete would be to sue
either the NFL or NBA players union for agreeing with the league to
implement a minimum age requirement in violation of the union's
duty of fair representation. To succeed on this final type of claim, a
court would need to make a broad determination about how widely
the union's representation powers apply, as well as about the proper
meaning of the term "discriminatory." This final potential claim has
the strongest likelihood of success if filed by a prospective plaintiff in
either the Second or Tenth Circuits. However, a court would likely
reject this claim in most other circuits.
Overall, the challenge of uprooting America's longstanding sports
bureaucracy will be complex, yet perhaps feasible. It will require both
a willing plaintiff and plaintiffs' lawyers that are armed with a thor-
ough understanding of the nuances in labor and antitrust law, as well
as how these laws differ between the circuits.
The time may be ripe to challenge the bureaucracy that prevents
young athletes from earning a living; however, the strategy in doing so
must be carefully orchestrated. Only with a carefully designed legal
plan that is based on an understanding of legal nuances will young
American football and basketball players have a reasonable likeli-
hood of success in challenging the bureaucracy that delays their ability
to earn a livelihood. And, only by allowing young athletes the oppor-
tunity to sell their athletic services in the free market will a segment of
society that is so idolized by many be able to secure for themselves
their fair due.
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